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Background: Poor information privacy practices have been identified in health apps. Medical app accreditation
programs offer a mechanism for assuring the quality of apps; however, little is known about their ability to control
information privacy risks. We aimed to assess the extent to which already-certified apps complied with data
protection principles mandated by the largest national accreditation program.
Methods: Cross-sectional, systematic, 6-month assessment of 79 apps certified as clinically safe and trustworthy by
the UK NHS Health Apps Library. Protocol-based testing was used to characterize personal information collection,
local-device storage and information transmission. Observed information handling practices were compared against
privacy policy commitments.
Results: The study revealed that 89 % (n = 70/79) of apps transmitted information to online services. No app
encrypted personal information stored locally. Furthermore, 66 % (23/35) of apps sending identifying information
over the Internet did not use encryption and 20 % (7/35) did not have a privacy policy. Overall, 67 % (53/79) of
apps had some form of privacy policy. No app collected or transmitted information that a policy explicitly stated it
would not; however, 78 % (38/49) of information-transmitting apps with a policy did not describe the nature of
personal information included in transmissions. Four apps sent both identifying and health information without
encryption. Although the study was not designed to examine data handling after transmission to online services,
security problems appeared to place users at risk of data theft in two cases.
Conclusions: Systematic gaps in compliance with data protection principles in accredited health apps question
whether certification programs relying substantially on developer disclosures can provide a trusted resource for
patients and clinicians. Accreditation programs should, as a minimum, provide consistent and reliable warnings
about possible threats and, ideally, require publishers to rectify vulnerabilities before apps are released.
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Systematic assessmentBackground
Mobile apps – software programs running on devices
like smartphones – offer a wide range of potential
medical and health-related uses [1]. They are part of a
consumer phenomenon which has seen rapid uptake
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that is set to treble in the next 3 years [2]. In consumer
surveys, a quarter of US adults report using one or more
health tracking apps and a third of physicians have rec-
ommended an app to a patient in the past year [3, 4]. As
apps offering monitoring and self-management functions
become commonplace, the opportunities for collecting
and sharing personal and health-related information will
grow. These changes bring potential clinical benefits [5],
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apps, or the services they connect to, confidence that
personal information is handled appropriately relies
mostly on trust. Users must trust in the ethical operation
of app services, that developers will comply with privacy
regulation and security-best practices, and that app mar-
ketplaces and regulators will intervene, if necessary, to
safeguard user interests. Health apps may put patient
privacy, defined here as the right of individuals to con-
trol how their information is collected and used [7]
(other definitions are possible [8]), at risk in a number of
ways [9]. Medical information stored on devices that are
lost or stolen may be accessed by malicious users, par-
ticularly if information is not secured using encryption.
Information may be shared unexpectedly because priv-
acy practices and settings are confusing or poorly de-
scribed. Some apps may offer free services in return for
access to personal information, an arrangement to which
users can only give informed consent if fully disclosed.
When physical, technical or organizational confidential-
ity arrangements are inadequate, information transmit-
ted online may be at risk of interception or disclosure
[7]. Global computer networks make it easy for personal
information to be transferred, inadvertently or otherwise,
into jurisdictions with reduced privacy protections. Re-
cent privacy-focused reviews of health and wellness apps
available through generic app stores have consistently
identified gaps in the extent to which data uses are fully
documented and appropriate security mechanisms
implemented [10–13].
Medical app accreditation programs, in which apps are
subject to formal assessment or peer review, are a recent
development that aims to provide clinical assurances
about quality and safety, foster trust, and promote app
adoption by patients and professionals [14–18]. Privacy
badging of websites has been found to lead to modest
benefits in the extent to which information uses and se-
curity arrangements are openly disclosed [19]. However,
the privacy assurances offered by app programs are
largely untested. In late 2013, one service had to suspend
its approval program after some apps were found to be
transmitting personal information without encryption
[20]. We aimed to understand if this was an isolated ex-
ample or symptomatic of more systematic problems in
controlling privacy-related risks. We used a systematic
method to appraise all health and wellness apps ap-
proved by a prominent national accreditation program;
the English National Health Service (NHS) Health Apps
Library [14].
Launched in March 2013, the NHS Health Apps Li-
brary offers a curated list of apps for patient and public
use. Apps are intended to be suitable for professional
recommendation to patients but are also available for
general use without clinical support. Registered appsundergo an appraisal process, developed in response to
concerns raised by UK healthcare professionals [21, 22],
that aims to ensure clinical safety and compliance with
data protection law. In the UK, the major governing le-
gislation is the Data Protection Act 1998 [23]. This en-
shrines eight data protection principles which place
limits on the appropriate and proportionate collection
and use of personal information, require that these uses
are clearly specified (for example, in a privacy policy),
establish the rights of individuals to control and amend
their information, and mandate safeguards against situa-
tions that might compromise these rights, such as
unauthorized access to data. In respect of privacy, the
accreditation approach adopted by the Health Apps
Library is to require developers to declare any data
transmissions made by their app and, in this case, to
provide evidence of registration with the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the UK body responsible
for enforcement of the Data Protection Act (information
obtained via Freedom of Information request). Registra-
tion entails a commitment to uphold principles of data
protection and is a requirement under the Act for individ-
uals or organizations processing personal information.
Thus, while substantially relying on self-declaration, it is
clear the expected intent, and the assumption that might
reasonably be made by app users, is that apps accredited
by the NHS Health Apps Library will comply with UK
data protection principles concerning information privacy.
The purpose of the current study was to assess the ex-
tent to which accredited apps adhered to these princi-
ples. We reviewed all apps available from the NHS
Health Apps Library at a particular point in time, and
assessed compliance with recommended practice for in-
formation collection, transmission and mobile-device
storage; confidentiality arrangements in apps and
developer-provided online services; the availability and
content of privacy policies; and the agreement between
policies and observed behaviour.Methods
App selection
All mobile apps available in the NHS Health Apps
Library in July 2013 and targeting Android and iOS, the
two most widely-used mobile operating systems, were
eligible for inclusion. Apps were excluded if they could
not be downloaded or cost more than 50 USD. Free,
demo and ‘lite’ apps were excluded if a full version was
available. Apps were also excluded if they would not
start, after two attempts on different test devices. Apps
available on both Android and iOS platforms were
downloaded and evaluated separately, but combined for
analysis. To ensure consistency, no app or operating sys-
tem updates were applied during the evaluation period.
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Assessment involved a combination of manual testing and
policy review. Testing was used to characterize app fea-
tures, explore data collection and transmission behaviour,
and identify adherence to data protection principles con-
cerning information security. Policy review identified the
extent to which app developers addressed data protection
principles concerning disclosure of data uses and user
rights. In a final step, policy commitments were compared
and contrasted with behaviours actually observed in apps.
These processes are described further below.
App testing
Apps were subject to a 6-month period of evaluation,
from August 2013 to January 2014. Testing incorporated
two strategies. To ensure coverage of features relating to
information collection and transmission, sequential ex-
ploration of all user interface elements was performed
for each app. After this, apps were subject to an ex-
tended period of testing which included periods of both
routine daily use and less frequent, intermittent inter-
action. The aim of this extended process was to uncover
app behaviours that might occur only infrequently but
were relevant from a privacy point of view, for example
time-delayed solicitation of feedback or transmission of
aggregated analytics data.
Testing was performed by two study researchers,
working independently. If required, simulated user infor-
mation was used to populate user interface elements.
For apps that required user accounts, app-specific cre-
dentials were generated. Diaries and logs were com-
pleted by supplying clinically-plausible information. In a
small number of cases (n = 2), apps offered mechanisms
to request support related to the app purpose, such as a
telephone call-back to receive more information about a
particular service. A further six apps incorporated user
experience feedback forms. To avoid misleading poten-
tial recipients of either support requests or feedback, we
annotated simulated information used to exercise these
functions to indicate its status as a test communication
that should be discarded and not acted upon. Recogniz-
ing that such flagging might act as a potential source of
bias if data handling were altered as a result, these activ-
ities were performed at the conclusion of the testing
process and once other aspects of app behaviour, data
collection and transmission had been characterized. Be-
cause the study involved only simulated user data, and
involved no human participants, informed consent was
not required.
Data entry and mobile-device storage assessment
Types of data that could be entered through the user
interface of each app were coded (data types listed in
Additional file 1: Table AF1). At the conclusion of theevaluation period, data stored on each test device were
transferred to a research computer for examination. File
management software [24, 25] was used to copy user
data files and app-specific data caches. Files were
inspected to catalogue the types of content being stored
for each app, and to identify any mechanisms used to se-
cure data, for example encryption. Because assessment
was not performed with the involvement of developers,
we only had access to storage at the device level, and
were unable to assess data stored in online services.
Data transmission assessment
To capture data transmitted by included apps, we recon-
figured local network infrastructure so that a copy could
be obtained without interrupting the flow of communi-
cation, a form of eavesdropping known as a ‘man-in-the-
middle’ attack (Fig. 1) [26]. The advantage of this approach
was that it required no modification to either apps or on-
line services that might have affected the process of data
exchange and bias interpretation. We combined an exist-
ing open source software tool [27] with custom scripting
and back-end database to capture and store all traffic gen-
erated during the test period. By making a simple config-
uration change to the operating systems on each test
device, we were able to intercept encrypted communica-
tions in addition to unsecured traffic (principles explained
in Additional file 1: Figure AF2) [28].
Prior to the start of the evaluation, we conducted pilot
testing using a range of system and user apps not in-
cluded in the study to ensure that all data would be cap-
tured. We anticipated that some test apps might
implement certificate pinning [29], a technical security
measure designed to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
on encrypted communications. However, in practice, this
was only observed for certain communications generated
by the mobile operating system and did not affect inter-
ception of traffic generated by test apps.
Personal information sent by apps was categorized in a
two-part process, using the same coding schema used to
analyze data collection (Additional file 1: Table AF1). In
the first step, an automated process was used to classify
data according to destination and the mechanisms used
to secure the content, if at all. Known instances of par-
ticular data types were also identified automatically by
searching for user details generated during testing such
as app-specific simulated email addresses. No data were
discarded during automatic coding. In the second step,
the content of captured traffic was displayed in a custom
software tool for manual review (see Additional file 1:
Figure AF3). Although all traffic was inspected, multiple
transmissions with identical content (excluding time-
stamps) were automatically combined for review. The re-
view process allowed study reviewers to check automatic
tagging and manually code any personal information not
Fig. 1 A ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack. A man-in-the-middle attack is able to intercept network traffic sent by a mobile app in a way that is invisible
to users and services
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searchers, working independently, and reconciled through
discussion.
Potential vulnerabilities in server-side controls were
explored through manual testing. To identify potential
authorization problems, we reset session state informa-
tion and replayed intercepted data requests to see if de-
veloper or third-party systems would return user data
without first requiring suitable authorization. Manual in-
spection of transmission also identified one instance
where messages incorporated parameterized database
queries potentially susceptible to malicious modification
through SQL injection. To confirm this possibility, we
modified an existing request to return data associated
with a second, simulated user account. During vulner-
ability testing we did not attempt to modify or delete
data, nor did we access data belonging to user accounts
not under our control.
Policy review
We systematically assessed the content of privacy pol-
icies associated with each app. We searched in-app
documentation, app store entries and related websites.
All documents that self-identified as a privacy policy
were included in analysis. We also located privacy-
relevant text forming part of other policy documents, for
example terms and conditions, disclaimers, and app-
store marketing text. We developed a coding schema
based on guidance produced by the UK ICO [30] con-
cerning requirements established by the Data Protection
Act 1998 (see Additional file 1: Table AF4). The schema
was used to assess coverage of data protection princi-
ples, for example disclosure of primary and secondary
uses of information, the intent to physical information
confidentiality measures, and mechanisms for accessing,
modifying and deleting personal information.
Assessment proceeded by systematically coding each
schema item as either being addressed or absent fromextracted policy text. For those principles relating to
user rights, such as the ability to opt-out of data collec-
tion, policies were additionally coded according to
whether a given right was afforded or denied in policy
text. However, while there were multiple instances where
policies made no reference to certain rights, there were
no instances where a user right was mentioned only to
be denied. Separately, policies were coded using the data
item schema (Additional file 1: Table AF1) to identify
the extent to which policies provided a complete and
correct account of those data items being transmitted to
a developer or third party. Individual data items were
coded as either ‘will transmit’, ‘will not transmit’ or ‘not
addressed by policy’. Coding was performed by two re-
searchers, working independently.
Coding decisions, as well as any relevant policy text
annotations, were captured using custom software (see
Additional file 1: Figure AF5). All decisions were reviewed
to reach a consensus agreement on policy coverage. The
nature of information actually collected and transmitted
by apps was then compared to specific commitments
made in privacy policies. We also recorded the operating
system permissions requested by each app at installation
or during subsequent use, for example access to user con-
tacts or geolocation service, as well as configuration op-
tions offered by each app to control the transmission of
data to developer and third-party services.
Statistical analysis
Data were compiled into a single dataset for analysis
(supplied as Additional file 2). We used simple descriptive
statistics to summarize aspects of data collection, mobile-
device storage and transmission. Unless otherwise stated,
the unit of analysis is the platform-independent app. Ex-
pectations that apps available on both iOS and Android
would substantially share privacy-related characteristics
were confirmed. Therefore, to avoid double counting, we
combined these apps for analysis. Because of the potential
Table 1 Basic characteristics of included apps
Characteristic Apps with characteristic,
n = 79 (%)
Platform
Both platforms 38 (48 %)
iOS-only 37 (47 %)
Android-only 4 (5 %)
Cost
Free 58 (73 %)
Paid-for 21 (27 %)
Version history
First releases 17 (22 %)
Older 62 (78 %)
App purposesa
Information provision 46 (58 %)
Healthy living and health promotion 21 (27 %)
Exercise and weight loss 8 (10 %)
Smoking cessation 6 (8 %)
Alcohol use 8 (10 %)
Drug use 5 (6 %)
Sexual health 5 (6 %)
Self-management 16 (20 %)
Long-term conditions 10 (13 %)
Diabetes 5 (6 %)
Hypertension 2 (3 %)
Otherb 5 (6 %)
Therapy-related management 11 (14 %)
Self-assessment 9 (11 %)
Diary or personal health record 27 (34 %)
Medication management 3 (4 %)
Reminders 4 (5 %)
Assistive technologies 4 (5 %)
Service directory or finder 9 (11 %)
Social networking 4 (5 %)
Collecting data for research 6 (8 %)
aMost apps supported multiple functions and are counted more than once;
bepilepsy (n = 1), irritable bowel syndrome (n = 1), Parkinson’s disease (n = 1),
sickle cell anemia (n = 1), stroke (n = 1)
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cific apps with confidentiality vulnerabilities. However, in
November 2014, the NHS Health Apps Library was pro-
vided with details of the vulnerabilities we identified.
We hypothesized that the likelihood of an app having
a privacy policy should not vary by platform or by the
distribution model (free or paid). Although apps for iOS
are subject to a quality control process prior to release,
and although developers of paid-for apps may have
greater resources to invest in quality assurance, an ac-
creditation program should apply the same privacy
evaluation rules to apps, and no significant differences
should be found. We used Fisher’s exact test to calculate
the two-tailed probability of an association between the
transmission of personal information and platform, dis-
tribution model and availability of a privacy policy. Stat-
istical analysis was done in STATA, version 10.0 for
Macintosh. We recognized that the type of app might dif-
fer by cost and payment model, and that this might con-
found analysis by altering the requirement for a privacy
policy. For example, information-only apps might not re-
quire a policy, and might also be more likely to be freely
available. Consequently, we performed a simple sensitivity
analysis by considering only those apps that collected or
transmitted personal or sensitive information. A signifi-
cance level of 0.05 was pre-specified for all comparisons.
Ethics statement
We used the Imperial College Research Ethics Committee
process flow chart (version 22/05/2014) and the Medical
Research Council (MRC) NHS Health Research Authority
Decision Tool (not versioned) to establish that ethics
approval was not required for this study, which did
not involve human participants or data pertaining to
individuals, and was conducted without involving
NHS staff or facilities.
Results
App characteristics
In July 2013, the NHS Health Apps Library contained 88
apps. After excluding 9 (details in Additional file 1: Table
AF6), 79 were selected for assessment (listed in Add-
itional file 1: Table AF7). Basic characteristics of in-
cluded apps are summarized in Table 1. Nearly half
(48 %, n = 38/79) of apps were available for both iOS
and Android, 47 % (n = 37/79) were iOS-only, and 5 %
(n = 4/79) were Android-only.
Included apps addressed a wide range of health and
health-related functions. Almost two-thirds of apps
(58 %, n = 46/79) offered written or multimedia informa-
tion. A quarter (27 %, n = 21/79) addressed health pro-
motion topics such as weight loss (10 %, n = 8/79) and
alcohol harm reduction (10 %, n = 8/79). A fifth (20 %, n
= 16/79) of apps provided tools to assist aspects of eitherlong-term condition self-care (11 %, n = 9/79) or self-
management relating to particular therapies and proce-
dures (14 %, n = 11/79), for example perioperative care
or chemotherapy side-effect surveillance. One in ten
(11 %, n = 9/79) of apps offered a self-assessment func-
tion. These included providing advice based on symp-
toms (n = 4), calculating future disease-related risk
(n = 4) for conditions including breast cancer and car-
diovascular disease, and testing eyesight (n = 1). A
third of all apps (30 %, n = 24/79) provided some form
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tion, for example medical history details or blood glu-
cose measurements. Several apps provided assistive
functions for those with speech and language (n = 3)
and motor (n = 1) impairments, for example text-to-
speech synthesizers. Nine apps provided access to
location-based listings of health services. One in seven
apps (15 %, n = 12/79) were NHS-branded products re-
leased in association with the UK Department of
Health or local NHS bodies.
Results of data entry and mobile-device storage
assessment
Most apps (89 %, n = 70/79) included some form of data
entry mechanism. The majority of these (83 %, n = 58/
70) collected generic user-generated content such as an-
notations (20 %, n = 14/70), appointments (14 %, n = 10/
70), bookmarks (16 %, n = 11/70), feedback ratings
(17 %, n = 12/70), messages (7 %, n = 5/70), reminders
(19 %, n = 13/70) and diaries (6 %, n = 4/70). However,
two-thirds (64 %, n = 45/70) allowed users to enter
strong identifiers, most commonly email addresses
(31 %, n = 22/70), username/password information
(30 %, n = 21/70) or a full name (23 %, n = 16/70). A fifth
(20 %, n = 14/70) of apps included a registration process
involving the creation of a user account. Registration
was mandatory in most (71 %, n = 10/ 14) of these apps.
Eight apps (11 %, n = 8/70) allowed photographs of
people to be stored, for example as a user avatar or to
track progress in weight loss. Half (49 %, n = 34/70) cap-
tured weaker identifiers, for example gender (26 %, n =
18/70), ‘blurred’ [31] location data, for example partial
postcode (20 %, n = 14/70), or age (16 %, n = 11/70). Al-
most three-fifths (57 %, n = 40/70) of apps captured po-
tentially sensitive information. Most (56 %, n = 39/70)
recorded health-related details consisting of measure-
ments made by users (n = 6), other medical history de-
tails (n = 14), or both (n = 13). Reflecting the number of
apps (27 %, n = 21/79) addressing health promotion
topics, almost a fifth of apps (19 %, n = 13/70) captured
information relating to alcohol, smoking and substance
use. A small proportion of apps (7 %, n = 5/70) captured
other sensitive information, including ethnicity (n = 3),
employment status (n = 2) and sexuality (n = 1). The ma-
jority of apps (84 %, n = 59/70) also collected other types
of user-generated content. This information was com-
monly related to aspects of health self-management, for
example annotations in personal health records (20 %,
n = 14/70), reminders (19 %, n = 13/70) or appointments
(14 %, n = 10/70). Some apps collected information ex-
plicitly intended to be shared with others. Both service
directories and some health promotion apps included
features for users to share opinions and feedback on ser-
vices and content (16 %, n = 11/70). A small number ofapps (6 %, n = 4/70) allowed users to post messages to a
forum or to other users.
Most apps accepting user-entered information (96 %,
n = 67/70) stored information on the device. Although
over half (53 %, n = 42/79) of apps stored personal or
sensitive information, no app encrypted local data stores
(Table 2). Of the 21 apps offering a username-password
combination or PIN to secure information, three-fifths
(62 %, n = 13/21) took steps to protect the information
by either not saving details locally (n = 10) or using a
hash or token instead (n = 3). However, two apps re-
vealed credentials anyway because the details had been
captured in temporary files kept by the device, a
phenomenon known as leakage [26]. Consequently, ac-
count details were easily accessible in over half of apps
(52 %, n = 11/21). Of the three apps which did not save
information, two were self-assessment questionnaires
designed to calculate a disease risk score and one was a
social network where all data were hosted online.
Results of data transmission assessment
The majority of apps (89 %, n = 70/79) communicated
with online services. Of those apps that transmitted in-
formation, a third (33 %, n = 23/70) sent information to a
developer-controlled server (Additional file 1: Table AF8).
Most (90 %, n = 63/70) also communicated with one or
more third-party services directly. The most common rea-
son for information transmission (in 87 %, n = 61/70)
involved loading content from a developer (n = 8) or
third-party (n = 49) service, or both (n = 4), in response to
specific requests generated by a user, for example search-
ing for specific health information. Nine apps sent user ac-
count details and other user-generated information to a
developer (n = 7) or third-party service (n = 2) to provide
services like account registration or to enable information
to be accessed on multiple devices. Six collected crowd-
sourced user feedback, for example anonymous ratings of
local health services. Two-thirds of apps collected infor-
mation for either analytics intended to assist product de-
velopment and improvement (61 %, n = 43/70), or as part
of a specific research project (9 %, n = 7/79). While only
six apps included visible advertising, for example ban-
ner adverts, just under a fifth of apps (17 %, n = 14/79)
sent information to advertisers or marketers directly.
Marketing and advertising-related transmissions most
commonly occurred because of tracking code included
in web-based content that was downloaded and dis-
played within apps, rather than due to tracking features
of the apps themselves.
Three-quarters of apps that transmitted information
(74 %, n = 52/70) sent information to locations outside
the UK, including the USA, Australia, Germany, Ireland
and the Netherlands. All were countries recognized by
the European Commission as providing adequate levels
Table 2 Security vulnerabilities affecting data storage and transmission
Security vulnerability class [49] Type All apps, n = 79 (%)
Insecure data storage Unencrypted data storage (of any data) 73 (92 %)
Unencrypted username/password 8 (10 %)
Unencrypted personal or sensitive informationa 42 (53 %)
Insufficient transport layer protection Identifying information sent without encryptionb 23 (29 %)
Sensitive information sent without encryption 6 (8 %)
Unintended data leakage Username/password captured in network cache or log 2 (3 %)
Health-related information sent to third parties 8 (10 %)
Fixed device identifier used as user identifier 9 (11 %)
Weak server-side controls Unencrypted access to server-side API 16 (20 %)
Access to user data without authorization 2 (3 %)
aExcluding username and password; bconsidering strong identifiers only
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were those most likely to be hosted overseas (Additional
file 1: Table AF8). Nearly all apps sending analytics data
(98 %, n = 42 of 43), and two-thirds of those sending mar-
keting data (64 %, n = 9/14), did so to non-UK servers.
Half of apps (50 %, n = 35/70) included strong identi-
fiers in transmitted information. Two-thirds of these
(66 %, n = 23/35, 29 % of all apps, Table 2) sent identify-
ing information without encryption, including email ad-
dresses (n = 5), account login details (n = 5), full name
(n = 2) or date of birth (n = 2). Twelve apps (17 %, n =
12/70) transmitted health-related information (n = 7),
other sensitive information (n = 3), or both (n = 2). Half
(n = 6) encrypted transmission of this information. Of the
remaining six which did not encrypt information, two
were research projects which paired information about
weight (n = 1) and substance use (n = 1) with weaker iden-
tifiers. Four apps, however, sent health-related information
together with strong personal identifiers to a developer-
hosted (n = 2) or third-party cloud service (n = 2) without
encryption. Six apps sent either strong identifiers (n = 3),
sensitive information (n = 1), or both (n = 2), to servers
hosted outside the UK without encryption. No association
was found between payment model or platform and the
transmission of personal information.
No app deliberately sent strong identifiers or sensitive
information to advertisers, marketing companies or
other content providers. A small number of apps risked
leaking information about user health status by includ-
ing details of search queries or page views in information
provided to advertisers (n = 5) or other third parties (n =
3); however, this information was not accompanied by
user-supplied identifying details. Instead, advertisers rou-
tinely generated their own identifiers or cookies which
were then stored and used by apps in lieu of other iden-
tifiers to track usage. Transmissions to analytics services
commonly used a similar mechanism to identify users.However, 21 % (n = 9/43) of apps communicating with
these services used a fixed device identifier, rather than a
randomly generated key, to identify users. Only one app
offered an in-app mechanism for disabling transmission
to analytics or third-party services.
In addition to issues affecting information transmission,
risks to confidentiality were identified in software applica-
tion programming interfaces (APIs) provided by online
services to communicate with apps. Of 27 apps with such
services, 16 (59 %, n = 16/27) allowed unencrypted access.
Two apps had critical vulnerabilities which permitted ac-
cess to user information, including information belonging
to other users, without authorization. The first did not im-
plement any form of access control, and the second was
susceptible to SQL injection, a type of attack that manipu-
lates queries sent to a database [33].
Results of policy assessment
Two-thirds (67 %, n = 53/79) of apps had some form of
privacy policy (Table 3). The proportion was higher in
apps in which users could record information (71 %, n =
50/70) and those transmitting user-related information
(70 %, n = 49/70). The availability of a privacy policy dif-
fered by payment model (P = 0.015) but not by platform
(P >0.99). Three-quarters (74 %, n = 43/58) of free apps
had a disclosure versus two-fifths (43 %, n = 9/21) of
paid-for apps. Considering apps only available on a sin-
gle platform, two-fifths (62 %, n = 23/37) of iOS apps
had a disclosure versus three-quarters (75 %, n = 3/4) of
Android apps.
Approximately a third (35 %, n = 28/79) of all apps,
and two-fifths (42 %, n = 25/59) of those collecting per-
sonal or sensitive data, were linked to some form of
app-specific policy. Less than a third of apps (28 %, n =
22/79) incorporated a privacy policy within the app it-
self. A small number of apps provided links to external
policies that did not work (n = 4), and one app crashed
Table 3 Availability of policy disclosures
Apps collecting data Apps transmitting data
Policy All apps,
n = 79 (%)
Any data,
n = 70 (%)
Personal or sensitive dataa,
n = 59 (%)
Any data,
n = 70 (%)
Personal or sensitive dataa,
n = 38 (%)
Privacy disclosure available 53 (67 %) 50 (71 %) 43 (73 %) 49 (70 %) 31 (82 %)
In-app privacy policy 22 (28 %) 22 (31 %) 21 (36 %) 22 (31 %) 15 (39 %)
Other privacy policy 48 (61 %) 45 (64 %) 38 (64 %) 44 (63 %) 29 (76 %)
Policy mentions app 8 (10 %) 8 (11 %) 5 (8 %) 8 (11 %) 5 (13 %)
Advertising policy 3 (4 %) 3 (4 %) 3 (5 %) 3 (4 %) 3 (8 %)
No privacy disclosure 26 (33 %) 20 (29 %) 16 (27 %) 21 (30 %) 7 (18 %)
In-app clinical disclaimer 36 (46 %) 32 (46 %) 26 (44 %) 33 (47 %) 13 (34 %)
aIncorporates strong personal identifiers, health-related information and other sensitive information
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of apps (61 %, n = 48/79) provided a disclosure on an as-
sociated website, but only 10 % (n = 8/79) of these web
disclosures specifically referred to the app. A small
number of apps (4 %, n = 3/79) had a separate advertis-
ing policy. Use of just-in-time privacy notifications was
restricted to prompts generated by the underlying oper-
ating systems when contacts, notifications or location
permissions were requested.
Policies varied in their coverage of recommended
topics (Table 4). Most apps (87 %, n = 46 of 53 apps
with policies) incorporated statements of intended
primary uses for recorded or transmitted information,
and three-fifths (58 %, n = 31/53) described intended
secondary uses. The extent to which these uses corre-
sponded to collected and transmitted data is dis-
cussed further below (see Concordance of policies
and data handling practices). Because we did not ob-
serve developer practices, the possibility that these
were only partial accounts of actual uses cannot be
excluded. Coverage of other privacy domains was
more variable. Perhaps reflecting the proportion of
policies sourced from the Internet, four-fifths (79 %,
n = 42/53) described how cookies would be used, but
only slightly more than half (53 %, n = 28/53) dis-
cussed data confidentiality mechanisms, and fewer
than one-fifth (17 %, n = 9/53) addressed data reten-
tion. Three-fifths of apps which transmitted informa-
tion explained how to edit specific information held
by developers or third parties (55 %, n = 29/53), or to
opt-out of aspects of information sharing (57 %, n =
30/53), but less than a third offered a mechanism for
viewing all information (26 %, n = 14/53) or requesting its
deletion (28 %, n = 15/53). While half (51 %, n = 27/53) of
apps indicated the jurisdiction governing the policy, a
small proportion clearly identified the legal entity respon-
sible for the policy and any data (30 %, n = 16/53), or the
jurisdictions under which data would be processed (25 %,
n = 13/53).Concordance of policies and data handling practices
Overall, 71 % (n = 50/70) of apps collecting or transmitting
information (or both) also had a privacy policy. For a small
number (4 %, n = 2/49) information handling was com-
pletely consistent with commitments made by the policy.
However, while no apps transmitted information where a
specific commitment had been made not to, four-fifths ei-
ther collected (82 %, n = 42/49) or transmitted (78 %, n =
38/49) one or more data items not addressed by a policy.
Most commonly, collections consisted of personal identi-
fiers (n = 35) or health-related information (n = 22) which
would be obvious or expected. However, nearly half of
apps did not fully disclose that strong personal identifiers
(n = 47 %, 23/49) would be transmitted and a quarter of
apps (24 %, n = 12/49) sent analytics information without
informing users. Of the eight apps stating that data collec-
tion would be anonymous, seven displayed behaviour con-
sistent with this claim, using either a randomly generated
identifier (n = 6) and/or weaker identifiers (n = 4) to iden-
tify users. One app, however, used a fixed device identifier
when reporting analytics data.
Operating system permissions
The assessment approach used to evaluate permissions
requested by apps to access operating system compo-
nents, such as device cameras or contact databases, var-
ied by platform. For apps available on Android (n = 42),
a systematic assessment was performed against permis-
sions explicitly declared at the time of app installation.
Common permission requests for which justifiable uses
existed in all cases were for network access by 93 % (n =
49/42), requesting device state by 71 % (n = 30/42) and
accessing local data storage by 52 % (n = 22/42). Less
common permissions for which justifiable purposes were
also apparent were to enable a user to place a call by ac-
tivating a number stored by an app (26 %, n = 11/42),
provide notifications using vibration (17 %, n = 7/42), re-
ceive push notifications (5 %, n = 2/42) and, in one diary
app, connect to a Bluetooth weighing scale. However,
Table 4 Coverage of privacy and security-related topics in privacy policies
Apps with a privacy policy
Apps collecting data Apps transmitting data
Domain Topic All apps,
n = 53 (%)
Any data,
n = 50 (%)
Personal or sensitive dataa,
n = 43 (%)
Any data,
n = 49 (%)
Personal or sensitive dataa,
n = 31 (%)
Uses of data Primary uses of collected data 46 (87 %) 43 (86 %) 36 (84 %) 43 (88 %) 28 (90 %)
Secondary uses of collected data 31 (58 %) 29 (58 %) 25 (58 %) 30 (61 %) 20 (65 %)
Sending data to developer-provided
online services
21 (40 %) 21 (42 %) 18 (42 %) 21 (43 %) 17 (55 %)
Sending data to advertisers/marketers 6 (11 %) 6 (12 %) 6 (14 %) 6 (12 %) 6 (19 %)
Sending data for analytics/research 19 (36 %) 18 (36 %) 14 (33 %) 19 (39 %) 16 (52 %)
Sending data while loading content 5 (9 %) 5 (10 %) 4 (9 %) 5 (10 %) 3 (10 %)
Anonymous uses only 8 (15 %) 7 (14 %) 7 (16 %) 8 (16 %) 4 (13 %)
Technical concerns Technical and procedural
security arrangements
28 (53 %) 26 (52 %) 22 (51 %) 27 (55 %) 15 (48 %)
How long data will be retained 9 (17 %) 9 (18 %) 7 (16 %) 9 (18 %) 6 (19 %)
Inherent risks or limitations of
security on mobile device/internet
19 (36 %) 18 (36 %) 14 (33 %) 19 (39 %) 11 (35 %)
The use of cookies 42 (79 %) 39 (78 %) 33 (77 %) 38 (78 %) 25 (81 %)
User rights Procedures for opting out
of data sharingb,c
30 (61 %) 28 (56 %) 25 (58 %) 30 (61 %) 19 (61 %)
Consequences of not
providing or sharing dataa
15 (31 %) 15 (30 %) 13 (30 %) 15 (31 %) 8 (26 %)
Procedures for subject
access requestsb,c
14 (29 %) 14 (28 %) 10 (23 %) 14 (29 %) 9 (29 %)
Procedures for editing data held
by developers/third partiesb,c
29 (59 %) 27 (54 %) 23 (53 %) 29 (59 %) 17 (55 %)
Procedures for deleting data
held by developers/third partiesb,c
15 (31 %) 14 (28 %) 14 (33 %) 15 (31 %) 10 (32 %)
Complaints proceduresc 28 (53 %) 27 (54 %) 24 (56 %) 28 (57 %) 17 (55 %)
Special procedures for handling
data for vulnerable users
9 (17 %) 9 (18 %) 8 (19 %) 9 (18 %) 6 (19 %)
Administrative details Identify data controller
or responsible legal entity
16 (30 %) 16 (32 %) 14 (33 %) 16 (33 %) 10 (32 %)
Legal jurisdiction governing policy 27 (51 %) 26 (52 %) 23 (53 %) 26 (53 %) 17 (55 %)
Jurisdictions under which
data will be processeda
13 (27 %) 13 (26 %) 11 (26 %) 13 (27 %) 8 (26 %)
Date of policy 8 (15 %) 7 (14 %) 5 (12 %) 8 (16 %) 3 (10 %)
Date of next review 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %) 0 (0 %)
Procedures for changing the
terms of the policy
17 (32 %) 17 (34 %) 14 (33 %) 17 (35 %) 11 (35 %)
aIncorporates strong personal identifiers, health-related information and other sensitive information; bbecause these topics are only relevant for apps that transmit
data, the denominator for calculated percentages is the number of apps with a privacy policy that also transmit data; cfor these domains, policies were additionally
examined to distinguish between rights afforded to individuals and those denied. However, in no case did a policy text mention a user right only to deny it
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location permissions, a clear reason, such as a mapping
function, was identified in only five cases. Similarly, jus-
tifiable reasons were only found in one out of three apps
requesting device camera access and two of three apps
requesting access to a local contacts database, and one
app requested calendar permissions without a clear pur-
pose. In no case where permissions were requestedwithout a clear use apparent in the app was there evi-
dence of data being collected via that route, suggesting
that these findings represent inaccurate permission dec-
larations rather than malicious intent.
In contrast to Android, iOS apps (n = 37 not available
on Android) used an on-demand approach to permission
management, where an opportunity to grant or reject ac-
cess was generated at the time when a particular feature
Huckvale et al. BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:214 Page 10 of 13was first used. Permission requests were identified, there-
fore, during the testing program. In general, no unex-
pected prompts were encountered. However, a small
number of apps (n = 6) produced by a single developer,
unexpectedly requested location information while dis-
playing written information.
Discussion
Medical app stores and accreditation programs are spe-
cifically intended to provide a trusted resource for both
patients and clinical users. In addition to offering clinical
quality assurances, they are well-placed to scrutinize in-
formation privacy. Some, including the NHS Health
Apps Library, incorporate specific commitments to that
effect [22, 34]. These are topical concerns for patients
and the public. Almost two-thirds of US adults asked
about the electronic exchange of medical information in
clinical settings identified privacy as a salient issue [35].
Users can struggle to accurately gauge privacy risks in
general app stores [36, 37] and often report feeling un-
comfortable about information sharing practices in
otherwise valued apps [38]. Unwanted disclosures of
medical information prompt understandable concerns
about impacts on relationships, health insurance and
employment. Certification and curated app ‘whitelists’
offer a route to allay these worries. However, if assur-
ances are offered, they must be robust.
Apps available through the NHS Health Apps Library
exhibited substantial variation in compliance with data
protection principles, demonstrated both by the avail-
ability and content of privacy policies, and adherence to
recommended practices for confidentiality enforcement.
Over half included functions in which personal details,
health-related information, or both, were transferred to
online services, but a fifth of such apps, and two-thirds
of apps overall, did not have a privacy policy. In this re-
spect, health apps, whether accredited or not [10], ap-
pear to be little better than non-medical apps available
through general app stores [39], despite greater potential
sensitivities surrounding health-related information.
While most, but not all, privacy policies explained how
information would be used, coverage of other aspects
that would enable a user to make an informed choice
about which information to disclose was less consistent.
For example, a sixth of apps sent information to adver-
tisers and third-party analytics but did not mention sec-
ondary uses of information in a policy. While there was
no evidence of malicious intent, a fifth of apps shared
limited information, including in some cases details of
medical topics that users had viewed or search for, with
advertising and marketing companies. Procedures enab-
ling user rights afforded by data protection law, such as
the ability to view and amend personal data, were incon-
sistently documented in privacy policies. The observedvariation prompts questions about the coverage, and
consistency, achieved by the certification process. For
example, it was not clear why differences in the likeli-
hood of having a privacy policy by payment model or
platform should exist in apps available through a com-
mon accreditation framework.
Two cloud-based apps had critical privacy vulnerabil-
ities; weaknesses of design that could be intentionally
exploited to obtain user information. As long as these
vulnerabilities persist, the privacy of users of these ser-
vices is in jeopardy. As recent data thefts from high pro-
file online services have shown, the risk is not simply
theoretical [40, 41]. Many apps took inadequate steps to
secure personal information, whether stored locally on
devices or being transmitted to online services. Most
concerning was the finding that some apps sent personal
information without the use of encryption. Mobile com-
munications may be particularly at risk of interception
because, unlike fixed computers, information is sent
using public computer networks for which users have lit-
tle control over confidentiality enforcement arrange-
ments. A small number of apps transmitted both
unsecured personal and health information, for example
research data pairing device and personal identifiers with
details of substance use. However, the bigger potential
risk to privacy is probably identity-related. Half of apps
transmitting user account details sent usernames and
passwords unencrypted. Armed with such information, a
malicious user might be able to access other resources,
for example email or online bank accounts. We found
examples of complete personal datasets, including name,
date of birth and contact details, sent as plain text. No
apps encrypted local data stores, despite the widespread
use of PIN or password security within apps that might
reasonably lead a user to believe their information was
protected. While recent changes proposed by operating
system manufacturers aim to ensure that information
stored on devices are encrypted by default, responsibility
for ensuing confidentiality during transmission will re-
main with developers. A failure to implement appropri-
ate technical safeguards of personal information does
not only imply a failure of accreditation, it may also rep-
resent a violation of data protection law in the UK [23].
The findings highlight potential shortcomings of an
accreditation approach that, in respect of privacy at
least, appears to rely mainly on self-declared compliance.
The strategy contrasts with that adopted by AppSalud-
able, another prominent certification program, which ex-
plicitly defines privacy criteria and combines structured
self-assessment with a formal evaluation process [42].
To our knowledge, however, the guarantees offered by
this program have not been subject to independent as-
sessment. Recent work has highlighted the potential chal-
lenge of defining appropriate governance standards for
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[11, 43]. In addition to being comprehensive and consist-
ent, governance arrangements need to be feasible, both for
developers and those appraising apps. The release of apps
in multiple jurisdictions potentially complicates the
process of reconciling different privacy requirements [44].
The ‘surface area’ of potential privacy risks is large. Most
apps included in this study exchanged information with
multiple services, including developer and third-party
data-hosting, analytics and content providers. Privacy is-
sues are likely to only become more complex with the ad-
vent of wearable medical technologies, devices connected
via the Internet of Things [45] and large-scale ‘big data’
analyses that combine information about individuals from
multiple sources. User attitudes to, and expectations of,
privacy are dynamic and sometimes contradictory [38],
and appraisal will need to reflect changing norms. For ex-
ample, today many users appear comfortable disclosing
certain types of health-related information, such as weight
loss or smoking cessation, on public social networks. In a
health context, such information would still be considered
unambiguously confidential, based on legislative frame-
works that are, in some cases, almost two decades old
[44]. Some issues are subtle, for example risks associated
with hosting web pages, which may contain separate track-
ing code, within apps. However, many of the privacy issues
we identified are well-recognized [6, 43], addressed by
best-practice guidelines targeting developers [31, 46–48],
and required little technical knowledge to uncover. Al-
though exotic privacy vulnerabilities are anticipated for
mobile health [6], all those identified in this study existed
on a list of top-ten issues for mobile technologies [49]. In-
deed, the greater threat appeared to be the risk of identity
theft rather than compromise of medical information. At
the very least, accreditation should ensure compliance with
industry-standard levels of encryption and authentication.
The implications extend beyond the risk of diminished
trust in health apps. Precarious privacy practices may
create new legal and liability issues, and these may ul-
timately require regulator involvement. Because health
and, in particular, wellness apps are often provided by
organizations that are not traditional medical providers,
they can sit outside the scope of existing legal and pro-
fessional safeguards [50]. In addition to questions of in-
formation ownership, health apps raise the prospect of
potentially sensitive information being processed by or-
ganizations with limited health experience, in jurisdic-
tions with varying levels of information protection.
Within healthcare organizations, existing governance
structures provide a basis for managing app-related
risks. However, these need to be able to adapt to the
changing technical landscape, and there remain unre-
solved questions of liability [51]. Recently, regulators in
both the USA and Europe have started to take action toaddress clinically unsafe and ineffective apps [52, 53].
Our findings suggest that privacy concerns should also
routinely feature in discussions about future regulation
of medical apps [51, 54], both as part of accreditation
programs and in the wider marketplace. Discussion
should also consider the balance between policy-level in-
terventions and the role of technical strategies that
might mitigate particular privacy risks. Recent develop-
ments include using ‘just-in-time’ strategies for alerting
users to potential privacy risks, ‘blurring’ personal infor-
mation to reduce its value to potential identity thieves
and infrastructure designed to secure the online process-
ing of clinical data [31, 44]. Viable solutions will need to
scale to the growing number of health apps, be applic-
able across the variety of app platforms, and be accept-
able to patients, developers and regulators.
By assessing all apps available through an accredited
medical app store we were able to sample a wide range of
app types including those from health providers and com-
mercial organizations. The frequencies of identified issues
reflect the specific population of apps available at the time
of assessment. Interpretation should take account of the
possibility that new and updated apps will exhibit different
privacy-related characteristics. This does not affect the
value of specific issues that need to be addressed, nor
broader patterns existing within the data, for example in-
consistencies in approaches to securing information. How-
ever, there is an ongoing requirement to ensure that new
issues are identified and prioritized appropriately. The de-
sign of the study allowed us to examine local app behav-
iour and the content of transmissions originating from,
and targeted towards, our test devices. However, we did
not have access to information once received by either de-
veloper or third-party services, nor were we able to ob-
serve how data were handled at an organizational level by
those services. Either or both of these may be sources of
additional privacy risks not directly quantifiable by this
study. These may arise as a result of technical and
organizational challenges in ensuring the appropriate stor-
age, handling and transfer of information held in online
storage [55]. Our approach, instead, relied on the degree
to which those practices were affirmed in a suitable priv-
acy policy, which may be an imperfect proxy for actual be-
haviour. Recent work has illustrated the scope for threats
arising from online storage of health information and
identified privacy-preserving strategies that could inform
future studies that assess compliance more directly [56].
Conclusions
Variation in privacy practices observed in clinically-
accredited health apps available through a dedicated
medical app store raises concerns about potential risks
to users and questions the ability of accreditation pro-
cesses relying substantially on developer self-certification
Huckvale et al. BMC Medicine  (2015) 13:214 Page 12 of 13to ensure adherence to data protection principles. Regu-
lators should consider establishing standards for ac-
creditation processes, and be ready to intervene if
accreditation programs cannot manage risks effectively.
If patients or the public are deterred from using apps be-
cause of questions of trust, then the potential clinical
benefits of mobile health will not be realized [57].
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